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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
NORM SMITH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 990236-CA 
Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SMITH WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
CONFRONTATION BY THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW 
HIM TO FULLY CROSS-EXAMINE OFFICER ORVIN 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants the right to call witnesses on their behalf and the right to confront the 
witnesses against them. Smith asserts that the trial court denied him the right to call 
witnesses and to adequately confront Officer Orvin by limiting his cross-examination of 
the officer. 
"The right to cross-examine is broad and seldom should be limited by the trial 
court." State v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1986). In addition, "[t]he focus of the 
prejudice inquiry in determining whether the confrontation right has been violated must 
be on the particular witness, not on the outcome of the entire trial. It would be a 
contradiction in terms to conclude that a defendant denied any opportunity to cross-
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examine the witnesses against him nonetheless had been afforded his right to 
'confrontation' because use of that right would not have affected the jury's verdict." 
Delaware v. VanArsdall 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435-6 (1986). 
Smith cross-examined Officer Orvin pro se. During the cross-examination, the 
State admits that many issues explored by Smith were relevant (App. Br. 20). The 
other questions Smith posed to Officer Orvin, which the trial judge stated were 
irrelevant, were used to explore the officer's memory of the events and the officer's 
perception of Smith during the alleged incident (See R. 931: 558-75). From the record, 
it is obvious that Smith was attempting to question Officer Orvin regarding his actual 
ability to see whether or not Smith's shirt was un-tucked, whether Smith did place his 
hand on his gun, and whether Smith did in fact point his gun at one of the officers (R. 
931: 558-75, 585). 
Smith's line of questioning was directed at impeaching Officer's Orvin's 
previous testimony which was marred by forgetfulness and evasion. Smith complained 
that Officer Orvin refused to directly answer straight forward and simple questions, 
thus the need for continued questioning (R. 931: 584). Smith's questioning was 
directly relevant and the trial court ended the questioning prematurely. The trial judge 
erred in concluding that this questioning was irrelevant, thus denying Smith the full and 
fair opportunity to expose the weaknesses in Officer Orvin's testimony. 
The mere fact that Smith was allotted the same amount of time as the prosecution 
to question Officer Orvin is not dispositive. In United States v. Vest, 116 F.3d 1179, 
1187 (7th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 1119, 118 S.Ct. 1058 (1998), the court 
allowed defense at least twice as much time on cross-examination than the prosecution 
2 
took on direct. An equal time basis is not an appropriate time limit to impose on 
defense when cross-examining a witness. 
Accordingly Smith asserts that the trial court denied him the right to call 
witnesses and to adequately confront Officer Orvin by limiting his cross-examination of 
the officer; and that this denial was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and 
requires reversal of his convictions. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 
SMITH USED OR INTENDED TO USE A CONCEALED WEAPON 
IN THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME OF VIOLENCE 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-10-504(3) 
Smith asserts that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain the 
jury's verdict that he used a concealed firearm in the commission of a crime of violence 
as is required for conviction of a second-degree felony pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-10-504(3). Officer Owen testified that he did not believe Smith 
intentionally concealed the gun (R. 935: 468). Clayton Call also testified that the gun 
was not concealed when the officers arrived (R. 931: 726-27). Further, when the 
officers arrived, Smith immediately showed the officers that he was carrying a gun in 
his holster (R. 931: 800). 
Even if Smith had un-tucked his shirt before officers arrived at the scene, there 
was no evidence offered that he did so with knowledge or intent to conceal a weapon. 
In fact, Smith's actions conclude otherwise. When the officers arrived, Smith believed 
they were there ii>response to his previous call for help, even though he called hours 
before (R.933: 874). But as soon as Officer Owen informed Smith why they were 
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there, Smith immediately showed the officers that he had a gun (R. 935: 281-82). In 
no way did Smith attempt to conceal from the officers that he was wearing a holstered 
gun. 
Contrary to the State's argument, Officer Orvin never testified that he directly 
saw that Smith was concealing a firearm (App. Br. 24). In fact, Officer Orvin testified 
that when he first arrived on the scene, he did not see Smith wearing a gun, but "if I 
would have studied it maybe harder, I could have, I could have anticipated or guessed 
that there could have been something there possibly" (R. 931: 521). 
Likewise, Sharon Felton testified that Smith un-tucked his shirt "just a few 
minutes" before the officers even arrived at the scene (R. 933: 1067-68). Felton 
further testified that from 50 to 75 feet, she could still tell that Smith had a gun even 
after he un-tucked his shirt (R. 933: 1068-69). This in fact creates a strong inference 
that Smith did not knowingly or intentionally conceal a firearm, since he had no way of 
knowing officers were coining a few minutes later. 
Furthermore, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Smith used a 
concealed weapon in the commission of a crime of violence.. Even if this Court finds 
that Smith concealed a firearm, it would be unreasonable and against the plain language 
of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-504(3) to assert that the "concealed firearm is used in 
the commission of a violent felony" since the officers were fully aware that Smith had a 
firearm before any alleged assault occurred. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO MERGE THE 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CHARGES WITH THE CONCEALED 
WEAPON CHARGE PURSUANT TO 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-1-402 
If this Court determines that the evidence was sufficient to convict Smith of the 
second-degree felony weapons charge, then Smith asserts that the trial court erred in 
refusing to merge the aggravated assault charges with the concealed weapon charge 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-402 as a lesser included offense. 
"In order to determine whether a defendant can be convicted and punished for two 
different crimes committed in connection with a single criminal episode, the court must 
consider the evidence to determine whether the greater-lesser relationship exists 
between the specific variations of the crimes actually provided at trial." State v. 
Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283 (Utah App. 1998). "Where two crimes are such that the 
greater cannot be committed without the necessarily having committed the lesser, the 
defendant cannot be convicted or punished for both." State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424, 
430 (Utah App. 1990). 
The State's application of State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990), is not 
relevant to the facts in this case, as the Utah Supreme Court considered for the whether 
aggravated robbery was a lessor included offense in regard to second degree felony 
murder statute. McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1235. 
Smith asserts that the State misapplies McCovey, attempting to add an additional 
prong to the two prong test outlined in State v. HilL The Supreme Court distinguished 
that aggravated robbery is not a lesser included offense of felony murder because 
"enhancement statutes are different in nature than other criminal statutes." 803 P.2d at 
1237. The Court stated, "the only reason aggravated robbery is encompassed within 
the definition of lesser included offense of felony murder is that the legislature 
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designated it as an enhancing offense. Aggravated robbery does not, by its nature, 
have overlapping elements with any traditional form of murder." Id. 
The Court stated that the main reason behind felony murder doctrine "has been 
to allow the State to obtain a second degree murder conviction without proving any 
form of mens rea.... In essence, it is a strict liability offense that enhances an otherwise 
unintentional killing to second degree murder." Id. at 1238. The Court further 
explained "if the legislature intended to make the underlying felony [aggravated 
robbery] a lesser included offense, then a felon could receive a two-for-one windfall by 
convincing the jury that the homicide was unintentional or accidental." Id. The Court 
concluded that the Utah Legislature intended that the multiple crimes of felony murder 
and aggravated robbery are to be punished as separate crimes. Id. at 1239. 
The Court decided against overruling Shaffer, but instead chose to allow 
legislative intent to decide the outcome. Thus, the real reason behind the Court finding 
aggravated robbery not to be a lesser included offense in second degree felony murder 
statutes was the interest in convicting people for killing others during the commission of 
a felony so that the defendant cannot claim that the killing was accidental. 
The same year that McCovey was decided, the Utah Court of Appeals decided 
State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424 (Utah App. 1990). In Kinse)/, the defendant attempted to 
steal $29.98 worth of merchandise at gunpoint, and was convicted of second degree 
felony retail theft. 797 P.2d at 426. The defendant appealed his conviction claiming 
his two convictions involved one act and the charges should have been merged under a 
lesser included offense. Id. at 429. 
This Court was left to decide whether the defendant could have committed retail 
theft, enhanced to a second degree felony when "the actor is armed with a deadly 
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weapon at the time of the theft" without the defendant committing the crime of carrying 
a concealed dangerous weapon. Id. This Court found that the defendant could not be 
convicted of both charges, holding "where two crimes are such that the greater cannot 
be committed without necessarily having committed the lessor, the defendant cannot be 
convicted or punished for both." Id. at 430. The theft charge was enhanced only 
because the defendant used a concealed weapon in the course of the theft. 
Similarly, in the present case, Smith was convicted of three separate charges 
arising out of the same alleged act. In order for Smith to be guilty of carrying a 
concealed weapon in commission of a crime of violence, he had to also be guilty of 
aggravated assault under the facts of this case. The alleged crime of violence that 
Smith committed was an aggravated assault on the police officers because of Smith's 
alleged use of a firearm. Under the facts of this case, it is clear that aggravated assault 
is a lesser included offense of the second degree felony carrying a concealed weapon. 
The State presents no evidence that it was the legislature's intent to punish each 
statutory crime separately regarding the facts of this case. McCovey is not relevant to 
the facts of this case. McCovey was concerned with second degree felony murder and 
the state's substantial interest in holding people strictly liable for homicide committed 
during a felony, even when the killing was not intended. The facts and interests in the 
case at bar are more akin to Kinsey, where this Court actually considered the relevant 
issue and charge of carrying concealed dangerous weapon. 
It is not simply enough to state that "the second degree felony provision for 
carrying a concealed weapon is an enhancement statute, 'different in nature than other 
criminal statutes'" to afford that statute protection from Double Jeopardy (App. Br. 
31). As outlined above, the Supreme Court clearly distinguished McCovey from 
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Shaffer and did not overrule Shaffer. There is no evidence that the Utah Legislature 
intended aggravated assault not to be a lesser included offense to carrying a concealed 
dangerous weapon. 
Smith, therefore, requests that this Court reverse the ixial court's refusal to 
merge the aggravated assault convictions with the second-degree felony concealed 
weapon conviction because a greater-lesser relationship does in fact exist between the 
two offenses and Smith is being punished for multiple times for the same act. 
POINT IV 
SMITH WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Smith asserts that trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and 
harmful based upon the following arguments: 
One, trial counsel failed to include in his motion for a directed verdict on Count 
I (the carrying a concealed weapon charge) (Trial Tr. at 625-26) the fact that the 
evidence produced by the State in their case was totally insufficient to establish the 
element of the charge that "did not have a valid concealed firearm permit" as required 
by Jury Instruction #13D, a copy of which is included in the Addenda. None of the 
State's witnesses testified that Smith lacked a valid permit to carry a concealed weapon 
as required by UtaliCode Annotated § 76-10-504 and Jury Instruction #13D. In fact, 
none of the State's witnesses were even questioned about a permit; and it was only 
during cross-examination of Smith himself that the State established this element of the 
crime (Trial Tr. at 961). 
Accordingly, at the time trial counsel made his motion to dismiss Count I there 
was no evidence which established the element that Smith lacked a valid permit to carry 
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a concealed weapon. While this Court "will not sit as a second fact finder" and will 
find the evidence sufficient if there "is any evidence, including reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from it, from which the findings of all the elements of the crime can 
be made beyond a reasonable doubt", if there is no evidence establishing an element of 
the crime then this Court must reverse for insufficient evidence. State v. Goddard, 871 
P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). 
Although a prosecutor is allowed to reopen a case in certain circumstances, none 
of the circumstances cited by the State apply to the present case. In each case where a 
trial court permitted the prosecution to reopen its case, the inculpatory evidence was 
immediately at hand and available to immediately present as admissible evidence to the 
jury. For example, in State v. Gregorious, 16 P.2d 893, 895 (Utah 1932), additional 
testimony was newly obtained during the short recess, and the witness was available to 
testify immediately. In State v. Lawrence, 234 P.2d 600, 604 (Utah 1951), it is 
evident that the prosecution could have easily proved to the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the two-year old Ford Sedan was worth more than $50. In State v. Seel, 827 
P.2d 957 (Utah App. 1992), as soon as the State's case was reopened, evidence was 
immediately received that the defendant knew a firearm was in the vehicle. And in 
State v. McNair, 666 P.2d 321, 323-24 (Utah 1983), all the prosecution had to do is 
make a motion to reopen the case and ask the witnesses whether the theft occurred on 
March 5 or March 22. Thus, all relevant case law regarding the reopening of a case 
supports the notion that the State must be able to prove the left out element and must be 
able to do so without delay. 
Contrary to the State's assertion on appeal, there is no evidence that the State 
could have "properly and with little difficulty [] moved to reopen and supply the 
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missing evidence" without delay at the time of trial. (App. Br. 40). Although Smith 
argued in motions before trial that no permit was required to possess a firearm on a 
place of residence or business, this was neither evidence of, nor admittance of, guilt 
(R. 332; 486; 513-14). Smith did not admit before trial or during the State's case in 
chief that he did not have a valid concealed firearm permit. The jury heard no evidence 
indicating that Smith had no valid concealed weapon permit before the close of the 
State's case and there is no indication that the State had present at trial the necessary 
witnesses and evidence that would have established that he lacked a firearm permit. 
If Smith's counsel had moved for a directed verdict, there is no evidence that the State 
could have presented evidence to counter this insufficiency without a significant delay 
in trial proceedings. All relevant case law regarding reopening a case supports the rule 
that the State must be able to prove the element and must do so without delay. 
In addition, Smith asserts that the State's reliance on State v. Lavodour, an 
unpublished opinion, is misplaced. In Lavodour, the defendant claimed that his 
confession was the product of police coercion. This Court stated that even if this was 
true, his two accomplices identified him as the leader of the robbery, so the trial court's 
admission of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant 
further claimed that if his confession had been suppressed, he would have taken a 
different defense tactic at trial. This Court found this argument to be "highly 
speculative," and given the other accomplices' testimony, observed "we are unwilling 
to countenance an argument that turns on a defendant having lost the opportunity to 
take a position at trial not consistent with the truth." 
In this case, in no way is Smith attempting to "take a position at trial not 
consistent with the truth." Nor was Smith's trial counsel's failure to move for a 
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directed verdict a "strategic decision" as the Appellee's claim (See App. Br. 41). 
Smith simply asserts that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith 
did not have a valid concealed firearm permit and that but for counsel's error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that he would have enjoyed a more favorable result and would not 
have been subjected to a conviction for a second degree felony. 
Two, Smith asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request that the 
jury be instructed on the offense of threatening with a dangerous weapon pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-506 as a lesser included offense to aggravated assault. 
One of trial counsel's duties is to "present such defenses as are available under the 
law." State v. Crestani, 111 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah App. 1989). Smith asserts that 
trial counsel's failure to request the lesser included offense denied him an available 
defense. 
In State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the defendant's use of a gun could either have constituted aggravated assault or 
threatening with a dangerous weapon and that the failure of the trial court to instruct the 
jury on this lesser included offense was reversible error. In Oldroyd, like in this case, 
the defendant was charged with and convicted of an aggravated assault under Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-5-103(b) against a peace officer. 685 P.2d at 554. Oldroyd, like 
Smith, pointed his gun at the officer and was asked several times to put down the gun 
before complying with the officers' command. 685 P.2d at 553. 
Smith asserts that like the facts in Oldroyd, the facts in this case "tend to prove 
the elements of § 76-10-506 as well as those of § 76-5-103(b)" and that "[u]se of the 
gun under the circumstances could either constitute an assault with intention to do 
bodily harm, or the lesser offense of exhibition of a dangerous weapon in a threatening 
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manner." 685 P.2d at 554. Accordingly, based on the Utah Supreme Court's decision 
in Oldroyd, Smith asserts that trial counsel's failure to request that the jury be 
instructed on threatening with a dangerous weapon as a lesser included offense to 
aggravated assault constitutes a deficient performance and meets the first part of the 
Strickland test. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that a deliberate and 
tactical choice was made to not request the lesser included instruction on threatening 
with a dangerous weapon as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. On the 
contrary, it was the ineffectiveness of Smith's trial counsel that caused the error. 
The offense of threatening with a dangerous weapon is a class A misdemeanor, 
compared with aggravated assault, a third degree felony. The reasonable choice was to 
request an instruction of the lesser of the two charges, giving the chance of either being 
acquitted of both charges or being convicted of the lesser charge. 
In addition, Smith asserts that he was also prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to 
request that the jury be instructed on threatening with a dangerous weapon as a lesser 
included offense to aggravated assault. In State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984), 
the Utah Supreme Court examined whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct 
the jury on threatening with a dangerous weapon as a lesser included offense to 
aggravated assault. The Court reversed the aggravated assault conviction because the 
defendant's use of a gun could have either constituted aggravated assault or threatening 
with a dangerous weapon and because the Court could not "say under the facts of this 
case the availability to the jury of a third option-convicting [the defendant] of 
threatening with a dangerous weapon-might not have resulted in a different verdict." 
685 P.2d at 556. Smith asserts that he was similarly prejudiced by his trial counsel's 
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failure to request that the jury be instructed on this lesser included offense because he 
was denied the opportunity of being convicted of threatening with a dangerous weapon, 
a class A misdemeanor, as opposed to aggravated assault, a third degree felony. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Smith asks that this Court reverse his convictions for 
carrying a concealed weapon, a second degree felony, and his convictions for 
aggravated assault, third degree felonies. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of October, 2002. 
Margaret # Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 
South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 23rd day of 
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